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Given the nascent nature of banking sectors in transition countries and their unique institutional
settings, this paper documents the effects of regulation on the efﬁciency of banks using system
GMM and dynamic panel quantile regressions for 21 transition countries for the period
2002–2014. Within the system GMM estimation the paper ﬁnds bank activity restrictions to be the
only regulation improving banking efﬁciency in these countries. However, the dynamic panel
quantile results show that the regulation has different effects at different quantiles. This study
provides important policy implications related to banking regulation in transition economies.1. Introduction
The literature on the ﬁnance-growth nexus consistently highlights the importance of a well-functioning ﬁnancial sector for economic
growth (e.g. King & Levine, 1993). Banking plays a key role in the ﬁnancial sectors of developing countries and emerging markets,
however, this research ﬁndings indicate that the observed high growth rates are unlikely to continue in the long term without major
banking reform in these countries (Berger, Hasan, & Zhou, 2009). But banking reform is not always effective and banks may not always
contribute to economic growth. In particular, the severe impacts of the global ﬁnancial crisis (2007–2009) have cast doubt on the
beneﬁts of on-going regulation in these banking systems.
Over the last two decades regulation has become a dominant area for banking research, most notably, the investigation of the effect
on stability, efﬁciency and performance. The availability of cross-country data on banking regulation from the World Bank and the IMF
has provided an opportunity for researchers and policymakers to explore the impact of regulation under various institutional envi-
ronments (Gaganis & Pasiouras, 2013). However, the research examining the impact of regulation on banking efﬁciency has received
relatively less attention. Moreover, there is no evidence of how regulation may affect efﬁciency in the banking sectors of transition
countries over the last two decades. Indeed, only two studies, Fries et al. (2005) and Grigorian andManole (2006), explore the impact of
banking reform and regulation on efﬁciency in transition countries during the 1990s. However, these studies are limited in three re-
spects. They poorly represent the former Soviet Union (FSU) countries, they tend to use old data (1994–2001 and 1995–1998
respectively), and they do not extensively investigate the efﬁciency effects of activity restrictions and the pillars of the Basel accords.
Such omissions are signiﬁcant considering that regulation is likely to affect banking sectors differently, depending on their economic
and institutional environment. This is important as many transition countries have integrated into the EU and their contribution to the
world economy has increased over the last two decades. Indeed, the nature of the banking sector within these countries has changed
signiﬁcantly over this period.
Thus, the purpose of this paper is to contribute to the literature on banking in the countries of Central-Eastern Europe (CEE), South-(K. Djalilov).
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In particular, the predictions of scholars on the effects of bank regulation are contradictory, despite the topic attracting signiﬁcant
attention following the global crisis (2007–2009). In addition, there is no strong evidence to suggest that the best system of banking
regulation is effective universally, given the unique conditions of the transition countries (Ayadi, Naceur, Casu, & Quinn, 2016; Barth,
Caprio, & Levine, 2006). Over the last three decades, the CEE, the SEE and the FSU countries have undergone signiﬁcant and complex
reforms following both the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the global ﬁnancial crisis. These include establishing a system of ﬁnancial
intermediation and consolidating their banking sectors as a result of privatization, liberalization and foreign direct investment from the
West.
This study contributes to the existing literature in several respects. Firstly, it extends the studies by Pasiouras (2008), Pasiouras,
Tanna, and Zopounidis (2009), Chortareas, Girardone, and Ventouri (2012), Barth, Lin, Ma, Seade, and Song (2013) and Gaganis and
Pasiouras (2013) in several ways. It includes the periods pre and post crisis; it takes a system GMM approach to consider the importance
of the dynamic nature of bank performance variables as well as the endogeneity of some important variables; and ﬁnally it uses dynamic
quantile regression to investigate the heterogeneous efﬁciency effects of regulation. Secondly, this study provides more detailed aspects
of the efﬁciency effects of bank regulation speciﬁcally in transition countries and examines them separately from other emerging and
advanced countries. In addition, this study includes the majority of the transition countries in the CEE, the SEE and the FSU some of
which have been ignored in previous research. Using a sample of 319 banks from 21 transition countries over the period 2002–2014, we
examine the effects of regulation on bank efﬁciency while controlling for various bank-, industry- and country-speciﬁc characteristics.
We consider Activity restrictions, Capital requirements, Market discipline and Supervisory power from the World Bank's surveys on Bank
Regulation and Supervision as bank regulation. The results show that Activity restrictions appear to be the only regulation that improves
banking efﬁciency within the system GMM context. In addition, the dynamic panel quantile results indicate that regulation has different
efﬁciency impacts at different quantiles. Finally, the banks in transition countries appear to be less efﬁcient over the crisis period
(2007–2009), but they become more efﬁcient over the post-crisis period (2010–2014). These ﬁndings are robust across various
speciﬁcations.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a discussion of why transition economies are different
from either developing or emerging countries. Section 3 presents the theoretical foundations of the paper and develops testable hy-
potheses. Section 4 describes the data and variables. Section 5 presents the empirical models and discusses the results and Section 6
concludes.Table 1
Financial system characteristics of transition countries.
Transition countries Emerging economies
1. History of market economy These countries have a much shorter history of a market
economy as they had a central planning system until the
late 1980s and early 1990s.
Emerging economies have much longer and better
established market economies.
2. History of ﬁnancial sector
development
Until the late 1980s and early 1990s transition economies
did not have an autonomous ﬁnancial system and before
the collapse of the FSU ﬁnancial transactions were part of
the centralized programme of state planning. All
investment related decisions were made centrally (i.e. by
Gosplan) on ideological and political grounds. Thus, the
history of the ﬁnancial sectors in transition countries is
short.
They have a relatively long history of market-economy
oriented ﬁnancial sectors.
3. History of banking sector
development
Prior to the collapse of the FSU, transition countries have a
monobank-type banking system, consisting of Gosbank (the
State Bank) and a few specialist banks. They did not engage
in activities undertaken by their counterparts in advanced
and developing countries. Thus, transition countries have
much shorter history of market-oriented banking sectors.
The banking sector of most emerging economies is
relatively better established and more developed with a
longer history of relevant legislation and jurisprudence.
4. Frequency of ﬁnancial instability and
crises (excluding the recent global
ﬁnancial crises in 2007–2009)
Most transition countries experienced ﬁnancial crises over
the 1990s: Romania (1990–92), Georgia (1991–95),
Hungary (1991–95), Bosnia (1992–96), Estonia (1992–94),
Poland (1992–94), Slovenia (1992), Macedonia (1993–95),
Albania (1994), Armenia (1994), Azerbaijan (1995),
Belarus (1995), Kyrgyz Republic (1995–99), Latvia
(1995–96), Bulgaria (1996–97), Czech Republic
(1996–2000), Russia (1998), Slovakia (1998–2002),
Ukraine (1998–99). Sourced from Cihak, Demirgüç-Kunt,
Feyen, and Levine (2012).
Emerging markets have been much more stable over the
last three decades (excluding the Asian crises in 1997).
5. European Union (EU) integration The EU integration of the transition countries is strong, i.e.
11 of them are EU member states - Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland,
Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. Others are preparing to
join the EU in the future.
This is limited in emerging economies.
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The Institutional Difference Hypothesis (IDH) is well established in the literature to compare institutional differences in advanced
and emerging economies (Julian & Ofori-dankwa, 2013). The hypothesis states that the institutions that support the efﬁcient func-
tioning of product, capital and labour markets are missing in emerging economies compared to those in advanced countries (Khanna &
Rivkin, 2001). In addition, the IDH suggests that differences in institutions create unique conditions that inﬂuence desirable business
activities and strategies (Guillen, 2000; Scott, 1995). Since the conditions in emerging countries vary signiﬁcantly, it is reasonable to
apply this hypothesis to distinguish transition economies from other emerging countries.
The focus on transition economies is motivated by the speciﬁc set of conditions that relate to this group that not observable in other
emerging or developing markets. Therefore, the results obtained from existing studies on the regulation-efﬁciency nexus may well not
apply to countries in transition to a market economy. Consistent with Haselmann and Wachtel (2007), we ﬁnd that banks behave
differently under different institutional settings and therefore a study focusing on bank efﬁciency in transition countries is able to
provide new insights into this relationship. Table 1 below brieﬂy presents some important characteristics of transition countries.
The banking sector in the majority of emerging countries has some restrictions on activities that are allowed in other ﬁnancial and
non-ﬁnancial sectors (e.g. insurance, real estate and etc.). However, this has not been the case in transition economies as they adopted
practices similar to those in the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries despite the fact that they
are largely less developed and not as robust as longer established market economies (Claessens, 2003). Moreover, the overall institu-
tional framework in transition countries is still young and underdeveloped (Hartwell, 2015) although the World Bank, IMF and the
EBRD have supported these countries in reforming their economic and ﬁnancial sectors. Foreign direct investment inﬂows have been
extensive over the last three decades, which has signiﬁcantly contributed to banking sector development by the transfer of international
best practice. Finally, Basel Committee (Basel I (1988), Basel II (2004) and Basel III (2010)) regimes have served as important guidelines
for ﬁnancial regulators (Sba^rcea, 2014; Triki, Kouki, Dhaou, & Calice, 2017). However, as ﬁnancial and banking regulation interacts
with local political, economic and institutional environments, their effects vary signiﬁcantly according to context and these unique
characteristics are taken into account in the paper, details of which are outlined in Table 1.
3. Literature review and hypothesis development
Banking regulation is a combination of supervisory and restrictive policies aiming to both protect the banking sector from excessive
risk-taking, andminimize moral hazard (Ayadi et al., 2016). Casu, Deng, and Ferrari (2017) state that banking regulation has changed in
response to the complexity, turbulence and development in the banking sector over the last decades, for example, the aim of banking
supervision has changed from monitoring bank activities to promoting internal management. In addition, bank capital requirements
have signiﬁcantly tightened. Market mechanisms to discipline bank activities (private monitoring) became a key objective in super-
vision and form the three pillars of the Basel accords.
However, questions about the effectiveness of banking regulation have always been important for researchers and policymakers,
particularly following the global ﬁnancial crisis (2007–2009) as some post-crisis studies indicate the weaknesses of regulation to be the
key determinant of crises (Cihak, Demirgüç-Kunt, Peria,&Mohseni-Cheraghlou, 2013). From a theoretical perspective, bank regulation
may have contradicting effects and this ambiguity is supported by empirical studies, which is discussed further in the next section.
Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2004) discuss two contradictory groups of theories in relation to whether regulation restricts or supports
bank activities. The ﬁrst group claims that the problem of conﬂict of interest may arise when banks are allowed to engage in a broader
range of activities, such as underwriting securities and insurance. In particular, banks with strong commercial links may unload se-
curities onto poorly informed investors to support ﬁrms with outstanding loans. This group also suggests that the moral hazard problem
intensiﬁes when banks engage in multiple activities and oppose prudential behaviour that allows unrestricted activities. In addition, it
becomes difﬁcult to monitor banks when they are engaged in a larger number of activities. This argument also supports the view that
banks become signiﬁcantly large and powerful when they are allowed to engage in various activities, claiming that such banks become
difﬁcult to discipline. Finally, with a broader range of activities banks become very large and this reduces competition and efﬁciency.
The second group of theories supports the concept of allowing banks to engage in a broader range of activities, that is, fewer re-
strictions allow banks to explore economies of scope and scale. As a result, the franchise value of banks increases when there are fewer
restrictions and thus banks take less risk and can diversify their income sources across a portfolio of activities. Empirical studies of these
relationships also present opposing results. For example, some papers suggest that a restriction on activities decreases efﬁciency, while a
broader range of activities can increase efﬁciency (Barth, Caprio, & Levine, 2001, 2013; Haque & Brown, 2017; Triki et al., 2017).
However, Pasiouras (2008) ﬁnds no signiﬁcant link between activity restrictions and efﬁciency. Furthermore, Pasiouras et al. (2009)
ﬁnd contradicting results, where restrictions on bank activities have negative impacts on cost efﬁciency, while they have opposite effects
on proﬁt efﬁciency.
Similarly, the level of capital requirements imposed by regulators is also controversial in the literature. According to the public
interest view, the policy of capital requirements signiﬁcantly reduces the level of moral hazard when the owners of banks are required to
have more capital at risk. This eventually leads to more careful lending and better performance (Barth et al., 2004; Triki et al., 2017). In
contrast, the private interest view believes that the public interest view ignores the costs associated with a higher capital requirements
policy. In particular, the private interest view predicts the beneﬁts from higher capital requirements will be lower than the costs. Under
the conditions of higher capital requirements, owners may pursue a costly ﬁnancing policy, prioritising equity over deposits (Haque &
Brown, 2017). This may reduce the incentives of banks to screen and monitor lending when equity capital becomes more expensive to
raise than deposits (Barth et al., 2004), ultimately leading to higher risks and lower efﬁciency.310
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stringency to have a positive effect on efﬁciency, while Triki et al. (2017) ﬁnd this is only true for large banks. Pasiouras (2008) also
states that capital stringency improves efﬁciency, but these results are not signiﬁcantly robust across all speciﬁcations. Pasiouras et al.
(2009) predict that capital stringency improves cost efﬁciency, but reduces proﬁt efﬁciency. In contrast, Oino (2017) ﬁnds a negative
association between tier 1 capital and the ﬁnancial performance of European banks.
According to the public interest view, powerful supervisory authorities improve the governance of banks by promoting the public
interest (Levine, 2003). In particular, strong and independent supervisors can prevent a bank from engaging in excessive risk taking
(Agoraki, Delis, & Pasiouras, 2011). Therefore, the public interest view predicts the effects of supervisory power on efﬁciency to be
positive, while in contrast, the private interest view predicts the opposite outcome. Consistent with Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine
(2006), the private interest view states that if supervisors are strong enough to discipline banks, they may also use this power to force
banks to support their private interests while allocating loans and resources. Although some empirical studies ﬁnd positive effects
(Haque & Brown, 2017; Pasiouras et al., 2009), Barth et al. (2013) show that supervisory power impacts positively on bank efﬁciency
only in countries with independent supervisory authorities. However, the present study will argue that the effect of the supervisory
authority varies under different institutional settings.
Finally, the role and importance of market discipline has signiﬁcantly increased in many countries following the last global ﬁnancial
crisis. Market discipline in the banking sector is deﬁned as the actions and reactions between creditors and depositors that inﬂuence the
risk preferences of banks. All market participants face excessive costs when banks undertake higher risks, and in response to this de-
positors may require higher interest rates, or threaten to withdraw their funds to penalise banks for their risk taking behaviour (Berger,
1991; Martinez Peria & Schmukler, 2001). With respect to monitoring and disciplining banks, scholars often argue against heavy
reliance on ofﬁcial supervision, as there are different incentives depending of the ownership stake in banks (Barth et al., 2013). Beck
et al. (2006) advocate that bank supervisory policy should also force banks to produce accurate information, and improve the ability and
incentives of private investors so they can monitor and discipline effectively. However, the private interest view argues that banks can
pressure politicians who could inﬂuence ofﬁcial supervisors to take actions in favour of the private interests of banks (Barth et al., 2013).
Therefore, the presence of an efﬁciently functioning market discipline is important.
Again, the empirical results on the efﬁciency effects of market discipline are inconclusive. Barth (2013) and Pasiouras et al. (2009)
ﬁnd that market discipline is positively linked with bank efﬁciency, however, Triki et al. (2017) state that increased transparency re-
duces the efﬁciency of African banks. On the other hand, Barth et al. (2004) argue that private monitoring may not be effective in
countries with poorly developed capital markets, weak accounting standards and incomplete legal systems. Moreover, the supervisory
authorities in some countries may not be sufﬁciently powerful to force banks to accurately disclose their ﬁnancial details in order for
enable private investors to monitor and discipline effectively.
In summary, two important points on the previous studies can be highlighted. Firstly, there is no strong evidence indicating the best
bank regulation that would apply universally. Secondly, the efﬁciency effects of banking regulation instruments vary signiﬁcantly
subject to the nature of the banking sectors as well as their institutional and regulatory environment. Thus, there is a need for empirical
studies that will link bank regulation and efﬁciency in transition economies. Although these countries have already adopted the uni-
versal banking model prevalent in OECD countries and engage in a broader range of activities, weak management and a lack of
experience persists (Claessens, 2003). Thus, the ﬁrst hypothesis is as follows:
H1. A restriction on bank activities improves bank efﬁciency.
Anginer, Demirguc-Kunt, and Zhu (2014) show that the effect of prudential capital requirements on bank stability appears to be
positive in those banking sectors with (1) relatively weak supervision and monitoring, and (2) underdeveloped institutions, features
present in the banking sectors of transition countries. On the other hand, the majority of these countries have experienced sustainable
growth and low inﬂation rates over the last two decades. This has caused increases in the demand for bank loans as banks play a leading
role in the ﬁnancial systems of transition countries. Therefore, the presence of prudential capital requirements may limit the growth
opportunities of banks. Thus, the second hypothesis is as follows:
H2. Prudent capital requirements lower banking efﬁciency.
The international organisations, such as the World Bank, the IMF and the EBRD, have provided support for transition economies and
this has led to increased conﬁdence and the transfer of best practices into the banking sector through the dominance of foreign
ownership and foreign direct investment over the last three decades. However, many banks still remain politically connected with and
without state ownership despite the fact that they are privatized. This suggests that these banks may coerce supervisors to act in the
interest of the bank rather than remain independent. Under these circumstances, the supervisory authority is not able to exert sufﬁcient
control to ensure bank stability and efﬁciency. Thus, the third hypothesis is as follows:
H3. Supervisory authority does not improve banking efﬁciency.
Over the last two decades, the banking sectors of the transition countries have become relatively complex. However, the institutions
linked to the ﬁnancial systems are still underdeveloped and are faced with obstacles to the smooth conduct of business, with corruption
and the enforcement of contracts. Moreover, lack of transparency in ﬁnancial transactions and poor quality of information is still
present. Under these circumstances, principal/agency relationships break down with severe limitations in understanding and assessing
risks, making established models of corporate governance in effective (Avgouleas & Cullen, 2014). In addition, most of these countries
have poorly developed capital markets with incomplete legal systems. Thus, we do not expect market discipline to be an effective tool to
improve efﬁciency in the banking sectors of transition economies. Therefore, the ﬁnal hypothesis is as follows:
H4. Market discipline is not an effective tool to improve banking efﬁciency.311
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4.1. Sample
The sample consists of 319 banks from 21 transition economies: 11 are European Union (EU) member states - Bulgaria, Croatia,
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia; 3 are European but non-EU member
states - Bosnia, Macedonia and Serbia; and 7 are FSU independent states - Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Moldova
and Ukraine.1 The data are an unbalanced panel, taken from Bankscope. All are commercial banks whose ﬁnancial statements are
available for at least three years during the period 2002–2014. Data for GDP growth, GDP per capita and inﬂation are from the World
Bank World Development Indicators. The regulation data are from the World Bank Regulation and Supervision surveys, and economic
freedom data are from the Heritage Foundation.4.2. Bank efﬁciency measurement (dependent variable)
To estimate a measure of efﬁciency a stochastic frontier model (SFA) as proposed by Battese and Coelli (1995) is used. Compared to
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), the main advantage of SFA is that it allows us to distinguish between inefﬁciency and other stochastic
shocks while calculating efﬁciency scores (Pasiouras et al., 2009; Semih Yildirim & Philippatos, 2007). Thus, SFA allows the mea-
surement of inefﬁciency for each bank from the best-practice frontier in a single step estimation incorporating bank-, industry- and
country-speciﬁc variables (Doan, Lin, & Doong, 2018). We follow Gaganis and Pasiouras (2013) and Luo, Tanna, and De Vita (2016) in
selecting input and output variables for the proﬁt frontier and take an intermediation approach. In particular, we treat banks as ﬁnancial
intermediaries collecting funds (deposits) as inputs, and transforming them into loans or other assets. Two output prices are used: (1) the
ratio of interest income to loans (p1), and (2) the ratio of non-interest income to other earning assets (p2). There are three input prices:
(1) the cost of loanable funds estimated by the ratio of interest expenses to total deposits (w1); (2) the cost of physical capital measured
by the ratio of overhead expenses to ﬁxed assets (w2); and (3) the cost of labour calculated by the ratio of personnel expenses to total
assets (w3). To control for different bank risk proﬁles, we include Equity as a quasi-ﬁxed input following Berger and Mester (1997). We
also use w3 to normalise prices and include a time trend to account for the changes in technology over time (T¼ 0 for 2002, T¼ 1 for
2003, to T¼ 12 for 2014).
The proﬁt function also includes dummy variables (Transition), GDP per capita, and an Economic Freedom variable to account for
cross-country heterogeneity. Three dummy variables distinguish three groups of Transition countries: (1) 1¼ EU and 0 otherwise – for
Transition1; (2) 1¼ FSU and 0 otherwise - for Transition2; and (3) 1¼ non-EU European countries and 0 otherwise - for Transition3.2 We
consider a multi-product transcendental logarithmic (translog) function to estimate the proﬁt efﬁciency of banks. The translog is widely
used in previous studies and provides more ﬂexibility while investigating the efﬁciency frontier (Luo et al., 2016; Tabak, Fazio, &
Cajueiro, 2012). The model to estimate the frontier is as follows:
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(1)1 We did not include the banks of the Russian Federation in the analyses as we believe that the country has a different history and needs more
careful consideration. For example, the country's political regime and its power in the geopolitical arena are different from those of the other Eu-
ropean transition countries and FSU. The ﬁnancial sector, particularly banking, is hugely sensitive to raw material exports and oil price volatility.
Moreover, the intensiﬁcation of geopolitical sanctions as well as slow growth signiﬁcantly effected on the banking sector of the country over the last
decade. In addition, the level of state intervention in the banking sector is very high and exceeds that of other countries in the sample. Particularly,
the state owned banks (Sberbank and VTB) account for about 60% of system assets, while top 10 banks supply about 70% of lending. Moreover, the
Central Bank of the Russian Federation revoked the license of 234 banks only for the period from January 2014 to July 2016 (IMF Country Report No.
16/231, 2016). In sum, we could deliver many more speciﬁcations of the Russian banking system not observable in other banking systems of
transition countries. Therefore, we believe it is reasonable not to include it in our analyses as the banking of Russia is a different story.
2 We use Transition1 and Transition2 dummy variables (dropping Transition3) while estimating the proﬁt function.
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term assumed to be independent but not identically distributed. The term ui,t follows a truncated-normal distribution with truncation (at
zero) of the N(mi,t, σ2u). The mean is deﬁned as mi,t¼ zi,tδ, where zi,t is a (1 x M) vector of explanatory variables associated with the
technical inefﬁciency effects in (1), while δ is a (M x 1) vector of unknown parameters to be estimated in (1). The coefﬁcients of (1) are
estimated in a single-step by using the maximum likelihood approach..3
Following Bos and Koetter (2011), we incorporate an additional independent variable, the negative proﬁt indicator (NPI), to account
for those banks who report negative proﬁts, as the dependent variable requires the natural logarithmic transformation and this is
undeﬁned for negative values. In particular, proﬁt is assigned a value of 1when proﬁt0; then, NPI equals 1 when proﬁt0 and equals
the absolute value of proﬁt when the latter is negative. Gaganis and Pasiouras (2013) and Luo et al. (2016) use this approach for
modeling banks with negative proﬁt.
4.3. Regulation indices
We construct four regulatory indices following the literature (Agoraki et al., 2011; Anginer et al., 2014; Delis & Kouretas, 2011).
These indices are Activity restrictions, Capital requirements, Market discipline and Supervisory power, all of which are calculated using the
World Bank surveys on Bank Regulation and Supervision:
a) Activity restrictions is calculated by considering whether the bank is allowed to undertake securities trades, insurance and real estate
activities, as well as ownership of non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms. This index ranges between 1 and 12, where higher values indicate more
restrictions;
b) Capital requirements. This index shows initial and overall capital stringency ranging between 0 and 8, where higher scores indicate
more capital stringency. Initial capital stringency refers to whether the sources of funds (regulatory capital) can include assets other
than cash or government securities and borrowed funds, and whether the regulatory or supervisory authorities verify these sources.
However, overall capital stringency shows whether risk elements and value losses are considered when calculating regulatory
capital;
c) Market discipline. This index considers whether banks are required to disclose their off-balance sheet items and risk management
procedures, and whether certiﬁed/licensed auditors are compulsory. This index ranges between 0 and 8, where higher values indicate
stricter requirements;
d) Supervisory power. This indicates whether the supervisory authorities have the power and the authority to take speciﬁc preventive
and corrective actions. This index ranges from 0 to 14, where higher values indicate more power for the supervisory authorities
(Appendix).
4.4. Control variables
To account for bank and cross-country heterogeneity, we use a number of variables common in the bank-performance literature
(Agoraki et al., 2011; Delis& Kouretas, 2011; Tabak et al., 2012). Proﬁtability is important as it is contributing to the efﬁciency levels of
banks. Therefore, Return on Assets (ROA) is used as a proﬁtability variable (Wu & Shen, 2013). Size (natural logarithm of total assets)
and Liquidity (gross loans/total deposits) are used considering that the scale and liquidity of banks may have different efﬁciency
preferences. Details of the data are in Table 2.
Bank ownership is also important as this may reﬂect the behaviour of senior management. Ownership is divided into three groups
with dummy variables associated with each. These are deﬁned as Foreign, State and Private that reﬂect the majority of shareholders.
Capital Ratio is also included, as banks are expected to trade-off higher levels of equity capital for risky assets and thus may impact on
efﬁciency.
To control for heterogeneity in bank industries, we use competition and too-big-to-fail (total assets of three largest banks/GDP)
variables following the literature (Tabak et al., 2012). As the Boone indicator is inversely proportional to competition, the more negative
themeasure themore competitive the banking sector is. However, we use Boone1¼(-Boone), the opposite of Boone, to make it positively
proportional to competition following Tabak et al. (2012). Since economic conditions impact on bank behaviour, we use Domestic credit
to private sector, GDP growth and Inﬂation to account for the macroeconomic environment. Finally, three dummy variables are used to
account for the different periods: pre-crisis (2002–2006), during-crisis (2007–2009) and post-crisis (2010–2014).
4.5. Model speciﬁcation
Given the dynamic nature of bank performance (Athanasoglou, Brissimis, & Delis, 2008; Djalilov & Piesse, 2016), we use system
GMM (Arellano& Bover, 1995; Blundell& Bond, 1998) and dynamic panel quantile regression (Galvao, 2011) to examine the effects of
the regulation on bank efﬁciency in transition economies. The advantage of the system GMM is that the approach successfully addresses
the problems of endogeneity. We followed Agoraki et al. (2011), and M€annasoo and Mayes (2009) to identify predetermined (weakly
exogenous) and endogenous variables. Bank management tends to take expected and actual performance into account when making3 Once the point estimates of ui,t (inefﬁciency) are obtained, estimates of technical efﬁciency are deﬁned as Efﬁciency¼ exp(-u).
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Table 2
Description and source of data.
Variables Description Source
Bank-speciﬁc variables
Efﬁciency Proﬁt efﬁciencies measured through SFA (Battese and Coelli's (1995) model) is used as a proxy
for Efﬁciency.
Authors' calculations
Size Natural logarithm of total assets Bankscope
Return on Assets Pre-tax proﬁt/Total Assets Bankscope
Liquidity Gross loans/Total deposits Bankscope
Capital Ratio Equity/Total Assets Bankscope
Foreign Based on the major shareholders, we classify the ownership into three categories: (1) Foreign – a
dummy takes 1 if the major shareholders are foreign family investors and/or foreign
organisations, 0 otherwise; (2) State – a dummy takes 1 if the major shareholders are domestic
states or public authorities, 0 otherwise; (3) Private – a dummy takes 1 if the major shareholders
are domestic family investors, 0 otherwise.
Bank websites
State
Private
Bank regulations and competition
Capital requirements Activity restrictions, Capital requirements, Market discipline and Supervisory power are calculated
based on the World Bank surveys on Bank Regulation and Supervision, where higher scores
indicate higher restrictions on activities, higher capital stringency, higher requirements for
ﬁnancial disclosure as well as higher supervisory power of ﬁnancial authorities. Four versions of
the surveys are used - Versions I (2001) for 2000–2001, II (2003) for 2002–2004, III (2007) for
2005–2007 and IV (2012) for 2008–2014. If some countries are not featured in the current
version of the survey, we use the survey response of the previous draft. Similar approaches are
taken by Kim, Koo, and Park (2013) and Agoraki et al. (2011).
World Bank's surveys on Bank
Regulation and SupervisionSupervisory power
Activity restrictions
Market discipline
Boone indicator Boone is an indicator inversely proportional to competition, i.e. the more negative the Boone
indicator is, the more competitive the banking sector.
World Bank's Global Financial
Development
Too-Big-To-Fail Total assets of three largest banks/GDP Bankscope
Institution
Economic freedom The index of Economic freedom provides a comprehensive view of economic freedom in a
country. The index ranges between 0 and 100, where higher scores indicate higher economic
freedom.
The Heritage Foundation
Macroeconomic variables
Domestic credit to
private sector
Domestic credit to private sector provided by a ﬁnancial sector (% of GDP) World Bank's World Development
Indicators
GDP per capita GDP per capita in US dollars
GDP growth Annual percentage changes in GDP
Inﬂation Annual percentage changes in consumer prices
K. Djalilov, J. Piesse International Review of Economics and Finance 64 (2019) 308–322future strategic decisions. Therefore, bank-speciﬁc variables can be considered as forward-looking. This implies that current bank
performance can impact on bank-speciﬁc variables in later periods. Thus, we assume a weak form of exogeneity (predetermined) for
bank speciﬁc variables following Louzis, Vouldis, and Metaxas (2012). Moreover, signiﬁcant economic reform, and changes in the
political infrastructure have increased ﬁnancial instability in transition countries over the last three decades. To attempt to reduce this
turbulence the supervisory authorities repeatedly changed bank regulation and macroeconomic policy, as they reacted to instability in
the current period. Therefore, we treat regulation and macroeconomic variables as endogenous, consistent with Agoraki et al. (2011)
and M€annasoo and Mayes (2009). System GMM assumes that the only available instruments are the lags of instrumented variables
(Roodman, 2009). We test the overall validity of the instruments using the Hansen-test. The estimating equation is speciﬁed as follows:
Efficiencyi;j;t¼ δEfficiencyi;j;t1 þ b1Banki;j;t þ b2Industryj;t þ b3Macroj;t þ b4Regulationj;t þ μi;j;t (2)
for bank i, in country j and at time t. The coefﬁcient δ lies between 0 and 1 and indicates the speed of adjustment. Bank vectors include
bank-speciﬁc variables, while Industry vectors consider the competition in the banking sector proxied by the Boone indicator and the
too-big-to-fail variable. In addition,Macro vectors include Domestic credit to private sector, GDP growth and Inﬂation control variables.
Moreover, Regulation vectors capture Activity restrictions, Capital requirements, Market discipline and Supervisory power.
The ﬁrst results are from system GMM, followed by those from the quantile regressions. Most previous studies investigate the impact
of regulation on bank efﬁciency assuming the effect to be homogenous (Barth et al., 2013; Pasiouras et al., 2009). However, considering
the heterogeneous nature of banks and banking industries across countries, that is, large vs. small, foreign-owned vs privately-owned,
quantile regression provides a richer description of the heterogeneous effects of regulation at different locations of the bank efﬁciency
distribution. In addition, quantile regression results are robust to outliers and distributions with heavy tails. Moreover, it avoids the
restrictive assumption that the error terms are identically distributed at all points of the conditional distribution (Klomp & De Haan,
2012).
5. Empirical results
5.1. Summary statistics
Descriptive statistics and correlations for the main variables are in Table 3. The arithmetic mean and high standard deviation of314
Table 3
Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix of the main variables.
M
e
a
n
S
D
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1
0
1
1
1
2
1
3
1. Efﬁciency 0.44 0.24
2. Size 6.57 1.87 0.11***
3. Return on Assets 0.01 0.05 0.30*** 0.03
4. Liquidity 1.01 2.56 0.03 0.07*** 0.22***
5. Capital ratio 0.16 0.13 0.17*** 0.50*** 0.12*** 0.14***
6. Boone 0.14 0.26 0.08*** 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.06***
7. Too-Big-To-Fail 0.35 0.25 0.01 0.26*** 0.06*** 0.05*** 0.23*** 0.20***
8. Domestic credit to
private sector
47.52 18.69 0.05** 0.20*** 0.14*** 0.02 0.17*** 0.15*** 0.55***
9. GDP growth 2.96 5.11 0.20*** 0.14*** 0.17*** 0.01 0.06*** 0.01 0.25*** 0.49***
10. Inﬂation 5.42 6.99 0.02 0.11 0.01 0.01 0.12*** 0.19 0.20*** 0.19*** 0.10***
11. Activity restrictions 6.78 2.33 0.17*** 0.02 0.10*** 0.00 0.02 0.10*** 0.04** 0.26*** 0.20*** 0.03*
12. Capital requirements 5.41 1.63 0.05** 0.05*** 0.07*** 0.01 0.10*** 0.21*** 0.08*** 0.45*** 0.27*** 0.02 0.16***
13. Supervisory power 11.44 2.04 0.12*** 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.01 0.07*** 0.13*** 0.38*** 0.23*** 0.27*** 0.13*** 0.12*** 0.01
14. Market discipline 5.90 0.92 0.00 0.09*** 0.03 0.02 0.09 0.30*** 0.30*** 0.23*** 0.11*** 0.18*** 0.26*** 0.46*** 0.11***
* Signiﬁcant at the 0.10 level, ** signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level, *** signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level.
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K. Djalilov, J. Piesse International Review of Economics and Finance 64 (2019) 308–322Domestic credit to the private sector (% of GDP), inﬂation and GDP growth indicate that they vary signiﬁcantly across these countries.
Also Table 3 shows that efﬁciency is positively correlated with the ROA, size, Activity restrictions and GDP growth. This may imply that
banks with higher ROA and larger in size are more efﬁcient. Moreover, this may also indicate that positive GDP growth and Activity
restrictions improve banking efﬁciency in this sample. However, efﬁciency has negative correlations with capital ratio and Supervisory
power. This may imply that highly capitalised banks are less efﬁcient. In addition, this may also indicate that Supervisory power decreases
efﬁciency in the banking sectors of transition countries.5.2. System GMM results
The main results from the system GMM are in Table 4. The table shows that the coefﬁcients are quite stable across models, and the
Hansen test indicates no evidence of over-identifying restrictions. Although Table 4 shows the presence of ﬁrst-order autocorrelation,
this does not imply that the estimates are inconsistent, as this would only be the case if second-order autocorrelation was present
(Arellano & Bond, 1991). The Arellano-Bond (AB) test results in Table 4 indicate the absence of second-order autocorrelation.
We apply the general-to-speciﬁc method when deciding which control variables should be included in the model, following Klomp
and De Haan (2012). Initially, we estimate model 1 (Table 4) including all control variables and year dummies from 2007 to 2014
without the main variables for bank regulation. Then, we delete the least signiﬁcant variable and re-estimate the model. We repeat this
procedure until the model includes only signiﬁcant variables at a 10% level. This means the control variables, such as size, capital ratio,
too-big-to-fail, domestic credit to private sector, as well as EU membership and ownership dummies are omitted. The main variables of
interest are then added individually in models 2–5, and model 6 includes all variables.
The results for the control variables indicate that return on assets, liquidity, Boone1 and GDP growth have positive signs, while the
sign is negative for inﬂation. This implies that more proﬁtable and liquid banks are more efﬁcient. The results also show that more
competitive banking sectors, as well as the countries with more sustainable economic growth, measured by GDP growth, tend to have
more efﬁcient banks, consistent with Barth et al. (2013). However, higher inﬂation reduces proﬁts by increasing costs and thus it
appears to be statistically signiﬁcant with a negative effect on efﬁciency, which is consistent with Kasman and Yildirim (2006) and
Pasiouras (2009). In contrast to the ﬁndings by Barth et al. (2013), our Activity restrictions are positively associated with efﬁciency
implying that more stringent bank activity restrictions increase efﬁciency. This is consistent with Pasiouras et al. (2009) suggesting that
banks may systematically fail to manage diverse activities when there is weak regulatory control. Hence, diverse activities may lower
their proﬁtability and efﬁciency. As for the other main variables, Capital requirements, Market discipline and Supervisory power, they do notTable 4
Regulation and bank efﬁciency -system GMM.
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Efﬁciencyt-1 0.386*** 0.373*** 0.389*** 0.388*** 0.363*** 0.362***
(0.066) (0.062) (0.063) (0.062) (0.066) (0.055)
Return on Assets 1.917*** 1.878*** 2.308*** 2.231*** 1.754*** 1.926***
(0.586) (0.553) (0.564) (0.518) (0.580) (0.520)
Liquidity 0.005*** 0.004** 0.006** 0.005** 0.005*** 0.004**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Boone1 0.064* 0.070* 0.070* 0.058 0.069* 0.075**
(0.038) (0.037) (0.038) (0.042) (0.039) (0.037)
GDP growth 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.006***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Inﬂation 0.002** 0.002** 0.003** 0.002** 0.002** 0.002**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
yr2012 0.033** 0.035** 0.037*** 0.034** 0.035** 0.032**
(0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Constant 0.231*** 0.181*** 0.189*** 0.222** 0.356*** 0.333***
(0.029) (0.036) (0.038) (0.088) (0.060) (0.088)
Activity restrictions 0.009** 0.008**
(0.004) (0.004)
Capital requirements 0.007 0.000
(0.006) (0.005)
Market discipline 0.002 0.010
(0.015) (0.016)
Supervisory power 0.010** 0.007
(0.005) (0.005)
Number of instruments 126 138 138 138 138 174
Hansen-test 0.373 0.326 0.453 0.492 0.465 0.321
AB test AR(1) (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
AB test AR(2) (p-value) 0.675 0.705 0.704 0.684 0.745 0.744
Observations 1810 1810 1810 1810 1810 1810
* Signiﬁcant at the 0.10 level, ** signiﬁcant at 0.05 level, *** signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. Boone indicator is
inversely proportional to competition (implying that the more negative the measure, the more competitive the banking sector). Therefore we use
Boone1¼(-Boone), the opposite of Boone, to make it positively proportional to competition following Tabak et al. (2012). Year dummies from 2007 to
2014 are used.
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The bank-speciﬁc variables are treated as weakly-exogenous (pre-determined), while the regulation and macro variables are
endogenous (see Section 4.5 for more details). System GMM assumes that the only available instruments are the lags of instrumented
variables (Roodman, 2009). We limit the number of instruments restricting the lag range to two.
5.3. Quantile regression results
We next consider the results from the panel quantile regression. Table 5 shows the results for lower (0.10 and 0.20), medium (0.50)
and higher (0.80 and 0.90) quantiles. We estimate a model including the controls and the main variables of interest. Clustered standard
errors are generated, consistent with the results of Parente-Santos Silva (2016). We reject the null hypothesis of a constant variance
estimated at the 0.50 quantile, which supports the application of quantile regressions in the presence of heteroscedasticity (Machado &
Silva, 2000).
Similar to the results from system GMM, ROA appears to be positively impacting on efﬁciency implying that banks with higher
proﬁtability are more efﬁcient. Although with different signs, liquidity and competition also appear to have effects, but only for highly
efﬁcient banks. Particularly, the effect of liquidity is negative, while higher competition improves bank efﬁciency, consistent with the
literature (Barth et al., 2013; Pasiouras, 2008).
As expected, inﬂation lowers efﬁciency, but only for medium and lower efﬁcient banks. Perhaps, managers of highly efﬁcient banks
can manage to make the necessary adjustments in their costs and expenses before the effect of inﬂation takes place, and thus they can
neutralise the negative effect of inﬂation. Similar to the previous results from system GMM, banks appear to be less efﬁcient during the
crisis (2007–2009) period. Activity restrictions, as before, appear to be improving efﬁciency, but only in medium and lower efﬁcient
banks. This implies that lower efﬁcient banks are not good managers of a diverse set of activities, and therefore, restricting their ac-
tivities may lead to higher proﬁt efﬁciency, which is consistent with Pasiouras et al. (2009).
However, the results also show that Capital requirements and Market discipline decrease bank efﬁciency at only some quantiles.
Particularly, Capital requirements impact only on medium efﬁcient banks. This is consistent with the ﬁndings of Barth et al. (2004)
suggesting that capital stringency may not robustly be associated with bank efﬁciency when other regulations are controlled.Table 5
Regulation and bank efﬁciency - quantile.
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
0.10 0.20 0.50 0.80 0.90
Efﬁciencyt-2 0.181*** 0.367*** 0.574*** 0.300*** 0.169***
(0.040) (0.055) (0.049) (0.038) (0.037)
Return on Assets t-1 1.026*** 1.668*** 1.204* 0.803* 0.375
(0.321) (0.390) (0.670) (0.420) (0.409)
Liquidity t-1 0.044 0.031 0.006 0.001 0.002***
(0.053) (0.057) (0.019) (0.000) (0.001)
Boone1t-2 0.010 0.008 0.038 0.068** 0.042*
(0.029) (0.043) (0.050) (0.032) (0.025)
GDP growtht-2 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Inﬂationt-2 0.002* 0.004* 0.003*** 0.001 0.000
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Crisis 0.041* 0.066*** 0.061*** 0.027** 0.017
(0.023) (0.024) (0.023) (0.013) (0.013)
Activity restrictions t-2 0.011** 0.018*** 0.012*** 0.004 0.000
(0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Capital requirements t-2 0.007 0.004 0.014** 0.002 0.003
(0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
Market disciplinet-2 0.021 0.036** 0.026* 0.010 0.009
(0.015) (0.016) (0.013) (0.009) (0.013)
Supervisory power t-2 0.006 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.004
(0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005)
Constant 0.263*** 0.275*** 0.381*** 0.577*** 0.755***
(0.085) (0.099) (0.092) (0.081) (0.078)
Observations 1569 1569 1569 1569 1569
R-squared 0.115 0.183 0.204 0.194 0.184
Parente-Santos Silva test (p-value) 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Machado-Santos Silva test (p-value) 0.000
* Signiﬁcant at the 0.10 level, ** signiﬁcant at 0.05 level, *** signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. Boone indicator is
inversely proportional to competition (implying that the more negative the measure, the more competitive the banking sector). Therefore, we use.
Boone1¼(-Boone), the opposite of Boone, to make it positively proportional to competition following Tabak et al. (2012). As bank-speciﬁc (pre-
determined) as well as regulation and macroeconomic (endogenous) variables are instrumented with their lags in the system GMM, we use their lags in
dynamic quantile regressions to make the results comparable across two approaches.
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Table 6
Sensitivity analysis - system GMM.
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Activity restrictions 0.010** 0.010** 0.009** 0.009** 0.008** 0.009**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Capital requirements 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.003
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Market discipline 0.010 0.008 0.011 0.008 0.004 0.004
(0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015)
Supervisory power 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.007 0.008 0.008
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Large 0.041*
(0.025)
Medium 0.022
(0.022)
Small 0.010
(0.034)
Pre-crisis 0.011
(0.013)
Crisis 0.029**
(0.012)
Post-crisis 0.029**
(0.012)
Number of instruments 195 196 196 174 174 174
Hansen-test 0.450 0.222 0.357 0.314 0.187 0.215
AB test AR(1) (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
AB test AR(2) (p-value) 0.693 0.719 0.775 0.794 0.656 0.696
Observations 1808 1808 1808 1810 1810 1810
* Signiﬁcant at the 0.10 level, ** signiﬁcant at 0.05 level, *** signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. Boone indicator is
inversely proportional to competition (implying that the more negative the measure, the more competitive the banking sector). Therefore we use
Boone1¼(-Boone), the opposite of Boone, to make it positively proportional to competition following Tabak et al. (2012).
The bank-speciﬁc variables are treated as weakly-exogenous (pre-determined), while the regulation and macro variables are endogenous (see Section
4.5 for more details). System GMM assumes that the only available instruments are the lags of instrumented variables (Roodman, 2009). We limit the
number of instruments restricting the lag range to two. We collapse the control variables to save some space.
K. Djalilov, J. Piesse International Review of Economics and Finance 64 (2019) 308–322Inconsistent with the previous studies (Pasiouras et al., 2009),Market discipline decreases the efﬁciency of lower efﬁcient banks. Perhaps,
this is consistent with the argument suggested by Barth et al. (2004) thatMarket disciplinemay not be effective in countries with poorly
developed capital markets, weak accounting standards and incomplete legal systems.
5.4. Sensitivity analysis
The results of alternative speciﬁcations for system GMM and quantile regressions are presented in Tables 6 and 7. In Table 6 we use
size dummies rather than size (columns 1–3, Table 6) as follows: Large (SizeþσSize), Medium (<SizeþσSize and >Size-σSize) and Small
(Size-σSize).4 In addition, we replace year dummies with pre-crisis (2002–2006), crisis (2007–2009) and post-crisis (2010–2014). The
results presented in Table 6 are similar to those from Table 4. Larger banks appear to be relatively more efﬁcient implying that their size
provides better scope to improve efﬁciency. The results also show that banks are less efﬁcient over the crisis period, but become more
efﬁcient over the post-crisis period.
We add Large (columns 1–3), Medium (columns 4–6) and Small (columns 7–9) dummy variables individually to our alternative panel
quantile speciﬁcations presented in Table 7. The results for all control and main variables are similar to those presented in Table 5. In
addition, Table 7 shows that Large and Small impact on bank efﬁciency with different signs. Particularly, Large improves the efﬁciency
of medium efﬁcient banks only. However, Small appears to have a negative effect on the efﬁciency of medium and highly efﬁcient banks.
Thus, in system GMM we found Activity restrictions to be the only regulation that improves efﬁciency in the banking sectors of these
countries. This ﬁnding supports Hypothesis 1, Hypothesis 3 and Hypothesis 4. However, the dynamic panel quantile results show that
the bank regulation has heterogeneous effects at different quantiles. In addition, the banks in transition countries appear to be less
efﬁcient over the crisis period (2007–2009), but they become more efﬁcient over the post-crisis period (2010–2014).
6. Conclusion
Over the last two decades, especially following the global ﬁnancial crisis (2007–2009), the assessment and the architecture of
banking regulations has received renewed interest from researchers and policymakers in order to try to lessen or prevent future banking
crises. Speciﬁcally, the exploration of the effects of regulations on stability, efﬁciency and performance has become a dominant theme in4 A similar approach was used to create dummies for competition by Tabak et al. (2012).
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Table 7
Sensitivity analysis - quantile.
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
0.10 0.50 0.90 0.10 0.50 0.90 0.10 0.50 0.90
Activity restrictions t-2 0.012** 0.013*** 0.000 0.012** 0.012*** 0.001 0.011** 0.012*** 0.000
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
Capital requirements t-2 0.010 0.011* 0.003 0.008 0.012* 0.003 0.007 0.015** 0.003
(0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005)
Market disciplinet-2 0.019 0.033** 0.007 0.019 0.026** 0.008 0.021 0.023* 0.011
(0.016) (0.013) (0.012) (0.017) (0.013) (0.012) (0.015) (0.013) (0.012)
Supervisory power t-2 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.003 0.004 0.006 0.003 0.004
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Constant 0.255*** 0.414*** 0.743*** 0.272*** 0.393*** 0.724*** 0.263*** 0.391*** 0.777***
(0.085) (0.088) (0.076) (0.097) (0.093) (0.078) (0.084) (0.093) (0.077)
Larget-1 0.056 0.033** 0.008
(0.040) (0.017) (0.016)
Mediumt-1 0.029 0.014 0.022
(0.021) (0.017) (0.014)
Smallt-1 0.004 0.069** 0.038*
(0.036) (0.034) (0.023)
Observations 1567 1567 1567 1567 1567 1567 1567 1567 1567
R-squared 0.108 0.208 0.176 0.111 0.205 0.166 0.109 0.206 0.181
Parente-Santos Silva test (p-value) 0.060 0.000 0.000 0.027 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.000
Machado-Santos Silva test (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000
* Signiﬁcant at the 0.10 level, ** signiﬁcant at 0.05 level, *** signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. Boone indicator is
inversely proportional to competition (implying that the more negative the measure, the more competitive the banking sector). Therefore we use
Boone1¼(-Boone), the opposite of Boone, to make it positively proportional to competition following Tabak et al. (2012). As bank-speciﬁc (pre-
determined) as well as regulation and macroeconomic (endogenous) variables are instrumented with their lags in the system GMM, we use their lags in
dynamic quantile regressions to make the results comparable across two approaches. We collapse the control variables to save some space.
K. Djalilov, J. Piesse International Review of Economics and Finance 64 (2019) 308–322banking research. However, research examining the impact of regulations on banking efﬁciency has received relatively less attention.
This study explores the effects of regulation on banking efﬁciency in transition countries for the period 2002–2014, with both theory
and policy considerations the motivation for the research. From a theoretical perspective, the predictions of scholars on the effects of
bank regulations are contradictory (Ayadi et al., 2016). In addition, there is no evidence to support the view that the best set of reg-
ulations would work universally. Therefore, it is essential to shed light on the regulation-efﬁciency nexus in the banking sector of
transition economies considering the unique conditions observed that are missing in other emerging and developing countries.
The study contributes to the existing literature in several respects. Firstly, it extends the studies by Pasiouras (2008), Pasiouras et al.
(2009), Chortareas et al. (2012), Barth et al. (2013) and Gaganis and Pasiouras (2013) in a number of ways by (a) considering the
post-crisis period in addition to the pre-crisis and crisis period; (b) applying system GMM to consider the importance of the dynamic
nature of bank performance variables as well as the endogeneity of other important variables; and (c) applying dynamic quantile
regression to investigate the heterogeneous efﬁciency effects of regulations. Secondly, this study provides more detailed aspects of the
efﬁciency effects of bank regulations speciﬁcally in transition countries investigating them separately from other emerging and
advanced countries.
The results indicate that the banks in transition countries appear to be less efﬁcient over the crisis period (2007–2009), but they
become more efﬁcient over the post-crisis period (2010–2014). In addition, Activity restrictions appear to be the only regulation that
improves the banking efﬁciency within the system GMM context consistent with Pasiouras et al. (2009). Moreover, the dynamic panel
quantile results indicate that the regulations have different efﬁciency impacts at different quantiles implying that one size does not ﬁt all.
Overall, our ﬁndings deliver important policy implications. Particularly, the results imply that the banking regulations such as
Capital requirements, Market discipline and Supervisory power are not sufﬁciently effective to improve the banking efﬁciency in the
transition countries. This suggests that the policymakers and supervisors need to explore the weaknesses of the on-going banking
regulations and improve their effectiveness. While doing so they need to take account of the speciﬁcations of their institutions as well as
business and economic environment. This is important as Allen and Gale (2004) state that the costs of ﬁnancial crises are not frequent,
although when they do occur they are large.
Appendix A. Supplementary data
Supplementary data to this article can be found online at https://doi.org/10.1016/j.iref.2019.07.003.319
K. Djalilov, J. Piesse International Review of Economics and Finance 64 (2019) 308–322AppendixInformation on regulatory variablesType of Source and quantiﬁcation World Bank Guide (WBG) questions
regulation320Capital requirements The variable is calculated by summing the answer scores.
Yes¼ 1; No¼ 0 for the questions 3.1.1, 3.3, 3.9.1, 3.9.2, 3.9.3 and 1.5.
Yes¼ 0, No¼ 1 for the questions 1.6 and 1.7.3.1.1 Is the
minimum
capital-
asset ratiorequirement risk-weighted in line with the Basel
guidelines?
Yes/No
3.3 Does the minimum ratio vary as a function of market
risk?
Yes/No
3.9.1 Is the market value of loan losses, which is not
realised in accounting books, deducted before minimum
capital adequacy is determined?
Yes/No
3.9.2 Are unrealised losses in securities portfolios
deducted before minimum capital adequacy is
determined?
Yes/No
3.9.3 Are unrealised foreign exchange losses deducted
before minimum capital adequacy is determined?
Yes/No
1.5 Are the sources of funds, to be used as capital, veriﬁed
by the regulatory/supervisory authorities?
Yes/No
1.6 Can the initial disbursement, or subsequent injections
of capital, be done with assets other than with cash or
government securities?
Yes/No
1.7 Can the initial disbursement of capital be done with a
borrowed fund?
Yes/NoSupervisory
PowerThe variable is calculated by summing the answer scores.
Yes¼ 1; No¼ 0 for the questions 5.5, 5.6, 5.7, 6.1, 10.4, 11.2,
11.3.1, 11.3.2, 11.3.3, 11.6, 11.7, 11.9.1, 11.9.2 and 11.9.3.5.5 Does the supervisory agency have the right to meet with external auditors to
discuss their report without the approval of the bank?
Yes/No
5.6 Are auditors required by law to communicate directly to the supervisory
agency any presumed involvement of bank directors or senior managers in
illicit activities, fraud or inside abuse?
Yes/No
5.7 Can supervisors take legal action against external auditors for negligence?
Yes/No
6.1 Can the supervisory authority force a bank to change its internal
organisational structure?
Yes/No
10.4 Are off-balance sheet items disclosed to supervisors?
Yes/No
11.2 Can the supervisory agency order the bank's directors or management to
constitute provisions to cover actual or potential losses?
Yes/No
11.3 Can the supervisory agency suspend the director's decision to distribute
the following:
11.3.1 Dividends?
Yes/No
11.3.2 Bonuses?
Yes/No
11.3.3 Management fee?
Yes/No
11.6 Can the supervisory agency supersede bank shareholder rights and declare
the bank insolvent?
Yes/No
11.7 Does the banking law allow the supervisory agency or any other
government agency (other than the court) to suspend some or all of the
ownership rights of a problem bank?
Yes/No
11.9 Regarding bank restructuring and reorganisation, can the supervisory
agency or any other government agency (other than court) do the following:
11.9.1 Supersede shareholders rights?
Yes/No
11.9.2 Remove and replace management?(continued on next page)
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regulationSource and quantiﬁcation321World Bank Guide (WBG) questions
Yes/No
11.9.3 Remove and replace directors?
Yes/NoActivities
restrictionsThe variable is calculated by summing the answer scores.
For questions 4.1, 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4, we have four different
answers:
Unrestricted¼ 1
Permitted¼ 2
Restricted¼ 3
Prohibited¼ 44.1 What is the level of regulatory restrictiveness for bank participation in
securities activities?
4.2 What is the level of regulatory restrictiveness for bank participation in
insurance activities?
4.3 What is the level of regulatory restrictiveness for bank participation in real
estate activities?
4.4 What is the level of regulatory restrictiveness for bank ownership of non-
ﬁnancial ﬁrms?Market
disciplineThe variable is calculated by summing the answer scores.
Yes¼ 1; No¼ 0 for 3.5, 10.3, 10.4.1, 10.5, 10.6, 10.7 and 5.1.
Yes¼ 0; No¼ 1 for 10.1.1 and 8.1.3.5 Is subordinated debt allowable (or required) as part of capital?
Yes/No
10.3 Are ﬁnancial institutions required to produce consolidated accounts
covering all bank and any non-bank ﬁnancial subsidiaries?
Yes/No
10.4.1 Are off-balance sheet items disclosed to the public?
Yes/No
10.5 Must banks disclose their risk management procedures to the public?
Yes/No
10.6 Are directors legally liable for erroneous/misleading information?
Yes/No
10.7 Are commercial banks required by supervisors to have a credit rating?
Yes/No
5.1 Is an external audit by a certiﬁed/licensed auditor a compulsory obligation
for banks?
Yes/No
10.1.1 Does accrued, though unpaid interest/principal, enter the income
statement while a loan is non-performing?
Yes/No
8.1 Is there an explicit deposit insurance protection system
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